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(lOLDA J. NUNNELEY, Respondent, v. EDGAR HOTEL
et al., Appellants.

III

Negligence-Violation of Statute-Requisites to Recovery.To recover damages in an action based on viollltion of a statutt', plaintiff must be, at lhe time of the violation, a memo!'T
of the elass for whose benefit the statut.e was enacted, till'
occident causing the injury must be of the uture the statute
seeks to prevent, and the violation must be the proximate
('llll!!£> of injury.
[21 Bmldings-State Housing Act-Purpose of Statute.-Health &
Saf. Code, § 16827, requiring a parapet at the roofline of every
vent shaft in an apartment house or hotel. is designed to
prevent persons wlliking mto the shaft opening, not to prevent
tht'ir falling therein by reason of sitting on the parapet.
f3] Negligence-Instructions-Violation of Statute.-ln an action
for injuries sustained in a fall into a shaft surrounded by a
p!irapet three inches lower than rt'quired by statute (TIt'lIlth &
SlIf. Code, § 16827), and over whIch a mattress had heen pillced.
it is error to read the statute to the jury and in!!trlll't thnt ih:
\'iolation eonstitutes negligenct' per liB, whert' thE' statuti' ,,'as
not enlll'ted tIo guard IIgainst the hazard en(·olllltered by plnin
tiff, lind it is not shown that had the pllrapl't Iwen of statutory
hpight, the mattresl< on whieh plaintiff sat, and from which
she fell, would not have been so placed. or that the dangerous
condition would hAVe been more apparent.
14a, 4b] Id. - Appeal-- Harmless and Reversible Error-Instructions.-]n A personal injury action in two counts, one based on
gl'neral nt'gligence, the other on negligence in the violation of
II statute, and in which plaintiff had a verdict against both
till' manager and owner of a botel without reference to the
I<ounts, an instruction on the effect of tht' violation of the
IIllItute, although error, is not ground for reversal where the
("'idl'nce of general negligenee is snffieient to t'stahlish the
lillhility of one deft'ndAnt as manager and the other as owner.
[6] Appeal- Presumptions - Instructions.-In an aetion against
two defQndAnt!! remlting in II vercie,t against both, and in
which instructions Ilpplipnhlp to only one were given, it will

[1] See 19 Cal.Jur. 6:-J2. 38 Am.Jur 837.
[3] See 19 Cal.Jur. 754.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Nt'gligence, §89; [2J Buildings, ~1;
[3) Negligence, § 194; [4] Negligence, § 24Ii; [6] Appeal and Error,
I U66; [6] Trial, § 62.
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be presumed that the jury understood and correctly
them, and that the verdict against the other deJ~enltiallt
based on evidence which was unaffected by such IDS1~rutmOIU"
[6] Trial-View by Jury.-No abuse of discretion appears in
mitting jurors in a personal injury action to inspect a -~' ••;,;IOM
into which plaintiff fell although changes had been made tD '
the structure after the fall, where the jury is instructed to
disregard thl' changes. and where the fact that they had heeD
made did not imply a dangerous condition at the time 1)f
fall. (Code Civ. Proc., § 610.)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of V£'IIUI~tw
County. Franklin G. West. Judge. Affirmed.
".0.

tariJ

Action for damages for personal injuries resulting from
down a shaft opening onto roof of a hotel building. Judgment {
for plaintiff affirmed.
'
Forgy, Reinhaus & Forgy, Arthur M. BradleY and Stanlq,
M. Reinhaus for Appellants.

Harvey, Rimel & Johnston and Fred D. Johnston for B,e.""'.
spondent.
~',
EDM.ONDS. J.-A jury awarded Golda J. Nunneley sub- \"
stantial damages for personal injuries sustained by ber ",nen '
she fell down a shaft oppning onto tbe roof of a botel bui1ding.~~'·
The appeal from the judgment in her favor presents for :.;
df'cif;ion questions as to the sufficiency of the evidence to'
snpport the verdict. the constructIon of section 16827 of the
IIi'alth and Safety Code, and the propriety of certain instructions based upon that statute.
The chain of events which led to the accident commenced
at a bar where Miss Nunneley met two Marine Corps s~rgeants. '
After a festive afternoon during which the group had a few",
drinks, she accompanied them to their rooms on the fourth,1
floor of the Edgar Hotel. The rooms on this floor did not
(~over the entire area of the structure, and from the hallway ,
.
nnl' could walk onto the roof of the' third floor.
The record includes evidence that by signs posted in cont;picuous places. guests were warned to keep off the roof. A~'
l'O}'ding to other testimony, there bad been added to cards
post.ed in several rooms stating the hotel rules, a typewritten
notice which read: "Stay oft' roof-No guests or persons al·
lowed on roof of hotel." Miss Nunneley and one of the

j
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marines told the jury that the lights in the hallway were dim.
and they saw no such signs. Three police officers who investigated the accident did not recall seeing any signs.
There is also testimony which may be summarized as follows:
Miss Nunneley and the sergeants each had one drink in the
hotel room, but did not finish it. None of the group was, .
intoxicated. In the company of one of her companions, Miss
Nnnneley stepped out of the hallway onto the roof of the
building. The door to the roof was open, and nothing but
a small ledge impeded the exit. The only light on the roof
was from the street lights or from adjacent bUildings.
The couple walked on the roof until they came to a mattress
which appeared to them to bE' resting on what looked like
"a flat top or another little roof like a little house." How:
ever, this was the opening of a shaft which extended vertically
downward for a distance of approximately two stories. No
lights could be seen coming from the shaft. The shaft, 68
inches wide, was surroundfrt by a parapet 27 inches high at
the point where the mattress rested. The mattress was 72
inches in length. Using thf Marine Corps term for a bed,
Miss NunnE'ley said ... Here is a sack. . . . I think I will sit
on ~t." IS~e ~id so-and feU to thE' bottom of the shaf~r~~_~~~___ .
serIOUS mJurlesThe manager of the hotel testified that he had placed the
mattress upon the springs of an old bed which was on the . .
roof. He said that he did not know it had been moved to
'
the top of the shaft and could not explain how it got there.
By the first count of her complaint, Miss Nunneley alleged
general negligence on the part of Gladys P. Brickel, the owner
of the hotel, and Charles F. Brickel, her husband, who was
tht' manager of it. Her pleading declared that there were no
i'
warning signs of the danger upon the roof, nor was there
adequate lighting. It also charged that, with the knowledge
of the defendants, the mattress was left upon what appeared
to be a solid foundation. In a second count, Miss Nunneley
asserted that the defendants were negligent in that a "vent
shaft." surrounded by a parapet less than 30 inches in height,
was maintained contrary to the provisions of section 16827
of the Health and Safety Code.
The jury returned a general verdict in favor of the plaintiff without reference to the two counts in the complaint.
A motion for a new trial was denied.
As ground for reversal of the judgment, the Brickels assert

j'
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that" certain instructioDS given to the jury were J)r~!judieiA
erroneous. In support of this contention, it is insisted
the provisions of the Health and Safety Code which
part of the charge do not apply to the hotel because
statute was enaeted after the b~ilding was ereeted, and .
not purport to apply reiroaetively. Furthermore. it is
even if the code seetion applies rE'troaetively. the opening
which Miss Nunneley feU is not a vent Rhaft within the m~mF,m
:ng of that term as used by thE' u.p:islature. The ..... ,...v.,~...,.,..
the court in allowing the jury. at Miss Nunneley's I'Plllnf!llt,
to vi.ew the premises. is also challf'np:ed. The appellants
that the premises were not in thp same condition at the
of trial as at the date of the Ilcciut'nt.
Miss Nunneley declares that in thp lip:ht of its legislati~ .
purpose and express terms. thp Pl'OVillionR of thp Health and
Safety Code upon which shp rf'lit'll art' applieable to her ca.
of action. With regard to tllp tt>rm "'Vf'nt shaft." • liberal
eonstruction of the statutp designt'd to IIl1nimize the hazarda
caused by open shafts would give her thp bpnE'tits of its pro: ..
visions. In any event, it is said, bel' ('OmpJaint refen
4' vent shaft."
and thE' anSWf'r of thE' BriekE'ls 8<"Cf'pts
"E'rm.and fails to deny tbat it was suc:b ao opening.
_.,o.,......:;;t
dition, she points to the reeorcl. which shows that the
•':vent shaft" and "Up:bt well" were nspd tpr'Ch:flnllf'8IbI1MJ
throughout the trial by COUDSP! for both parties.
Other points relied upon in support of the judgment art
that the instructions attacked by thp appellants eould not be . .
prejudicially erroneous as far as the judgment agninst Char'", .
F. Brickel is concerned becaUse, by their terms, they art' .,ot .
direetedto any eonduct by him. FurthermQre. thp ('()mplain~
is in two counts and a Jteneral verdiet was r(·tnrof'd without
mention of either of them. Miss Nunneley also al'Jnle8 that,
because the Brickels did not question the form of till' vprdit't!
nor request submission ofspeeiaJ issUE's to fht' jurr. the eha(- .
lenged instructions are not prejudicially t'rrnnt'OUR if the .
'evidence upon either count will sllstain the gt'lIE'rnl "prd..... .
Another point relied upon is the contention' that jf fhp BrwkeJI .
wished to have the jury informed as to tht.' 1E'/!1l1 ditrt'rence
between a "vent shaft" and a "light well." it W8M their duty
to oft'er appropriate instructions. As they did IIl1t do so.~ht
says. they are not in a position to complain that t.he jury was
not properly chargE'd.
[1] Assuming, but not dE'eiC\irl~. that by maintaining a .
parapet leHS than 30 inches in height around an open shaft.;
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the owner of the Edgar Hotel violated section 16827 of the
Health and Safety Code, Miss Nunneley may not recover
damages based upon such violation unless she is one of the
class of persons for whose benefit the statute was enacted.
She must also prove that the accident was of the nature which
the statute was designed to prevent, and present proof of
violation of the statute as the proximate cause of her injury.
Not every infraction of a statute will result in civil liability.
"Many statutes, such as those directed against various activities on Sunday, obviously are intended to protect the
interests of the state, or the community at large, rather than
those of any particular class of individuals." (Prosser, Torts,
p.266.) It follows that violation of such a statute constitutes
actionable negligence only as to those persons for whose benefit or protection the statute was enacted. (Routh v. Quinn,
20 Ca1.2d 488 [127 P.2d I, 149 A.L.R. 215] ; King v. Sam Diego
Elec. R. Co., 176 Cal. 266 [168 P. 131]; and see 19 Ca1.Jur.
p. 635.) But clearly section 16827 of the Health and Safety
Code was enacted for the protection of any person lawfully
011 or about the premises, and Miss Nunneley came within
that category.
However, there is the additional issue of whether the purpose of the statutory requirement for a SO-inch parapet is
to protect one from the type of accident which is shown by
the record in this case. Violation of a legislative enactment
by failing to do a required act results in liability only if ". . .
the harm which the violation causes is that from which it was
the purpose of the enactment to protect.•.• " (Rest., Torts,
§ 286, comment on clause c.)
A well known case in which this rule was applied is Gorris
v. Scott, 9 Ex. 125, L.R. 1874, which concerned a statute
specifying the minimum size of pens upon vessels transporting
animals across the ocean. The purpose of the legislation was
to prevent sickness likely to result from overcrowding. The
plaintiiI's sheep were lost during a storm. It was held that
the failure of the shipowner to provide pens did not constitute
actionable negligence because loss of the sheep by being washed
overboard during the storm ". • . was not contemplated at
all by the statute. . . ."
More in point is Indiana & Ohicago Coal Co. v. Neal, 166
Ind. 458 [77 N.E. 850, 9 Ann.Cas. 424], which concerned a
driver of a coal car who was injm('(i while opening the door
to the mine. In Vlolation of a statute, no person had becn
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designated to open and close the door. Recovery was .. - .• ~....
because the purpose of the statute was to prevent int,ert'lI!w!ftiiiol
with circulation of air and not to guard against injury recei'Yilili
by a person who opened such a door.
. The same conclusion was reached in Flynf& v. Gordoft,' '
N.B; 198, 200 [165 A. 715], where the court said: ..
violation of a statute or ordinance becomes an actionable - .. ~"",":;'"
only when the consequences contemplated by the. prlD.nIliOl~
in question have actually resulted from its violation. If
of the consequences which the enactment was designed to anll~a
against have resulted' from its breach, such a breach does Dbt .
constitute an actionable wrong even though some other inju~ "
rious consequence has resulted. It is not enough for a plaintiff .
to show that the defendant neglected a duty imposed by statute
and that he would not have been injured if the duty bad','
been performed. He must go further and show that his inj~ .
was caused by his exposure to a hazard from which it
the purpose of the statute to protect him." The a~~1S10ns
this court are to the same effect. (Satterleev. Orange
School Dist.,29 Cal.2d 581 [177 P.2d 279] ; Harm v.
28 Cal.2d 418 (170 P.2d 454].)
[2. 8] Obviously:,.thestlltu~ I,lpon, which Miss .NlllllDieleJ~
relies was not enacted for the purpose of protecting her agllliDiR
the type of hazard she encountered. The manifest •.,t...,.'1nll
of the Legislature in specifying a minimum height of .
for the parapet of every vent shaft in the roof of an
, •. '
house or hotel was to protect a person lawfully upon the prem.- _ .
ises from walking or stumbling into the opening. Upon no '
reasonable theory may it be said that the legislation was de- .
signed to guard one from the danger of falling into 8 shaft
by reason of sitting upon the parapet. A wall 30 inches in .
height presents no more obstacle to sitting upon it than one
three inches lower.
Ij'urthermore, no liability can be predicated upon noncompliance with a statutory command if the act or omission hail .
no causal connection with the plaintiff's injury. (Blodge"
v. B. B. Dyas Co., 4 Cal.2d 51l, 513 [50 P.2d 801J; WohZ6f&berg '."
v. Malcewicz, 56 Cal.App.2d 508, 512 [133 P.2d 121.) Other~'
wise stated, ". . . the act or omission must proximately cauSe
or contribute to the injury." (HitsOfl v. Dwyer, 61 Cal..App.!
2d 803, 808 l143 P.2d 9521.) In the Blodgett case, the plain- 'j
tiff sustained injury from falling down a stairway which, in;
violation of an ordinance. was not equipped with 8 center ~
handrail. In affirming a judgment of lloWlwt the court aaid:c;.q
~

~

"~
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tiThe evidence shows thai the lack of the handrail was neither
tbe proximate nor any cause of plaintiff's fall. Any violation
of the ordinance by the defendant would, therefore. be i!:I."
material. "
The decision in Burlt v. Bank of Califomia Nat. Assn., 211
Cal. 548 [296 P. 68], was based upon the same principle.
There the plaintitl charged that the collapse of 8. building
resulted from noncompliance with certain building requirements. In denying recovery, it.was held: "Even though the
structure failed to comply with the huilding laws, the trial
court might reasonably conclude, as it did, that the sole, proximate cause of the damage . . . was appellant's ncgligence
ill unreasonably and excessively overloading the building, and
that such injury and damage would have resulted from such
overloading even if the structure had satisfied all building law
requirements." To the same effect are: Dewhirst v. Leopold.
194 Cal. 424 [229 P. 301; Williams v. Southern Pacific Co., 173
Cal. 625 [160 P. 660J ; Thomas v. German Gen. etc. Soc., 168
Cal. 183 (141 P. 1186] (defendant had not complied with an
ordinance requiring automatic closing devices. but the negligence of a fellow servant in moving the elevator was held to
·.--be,;the ..proximate_.~llS~.. of plaintiff's injuries); Kauffman v.
Machin Shirl Co., 167 Cal. 506[140 P.l5] ;8kaggs v. Wiley,
J08 Oal.App. 429 l292 P. 132] (statutory requirement as to
6p('ed of vehicle must -be the proximate cause of the accident) ;.
Pro-vin v. Continental Oil Co., 49 Cal.App.2d 417 [121 P.2d
7401 (improper construction of loading rack not the proximate
cause of collision on highway where tank truck made a U-turn
after backing from the loading rack).
Unquestionably, the cause of Miss Nunneley's injuries was
110t the fact that the parapet was three inches lower than
required by statute. No evidence was offered to prove that
had the wall been 30 inches in height the mattress would not
have been placed upon it, or that at the higher level the
dangerous condition would have been more apparent. Never-\
theless, the jury was instructed as follows: "Health and Safety I
Code, sec. 16827. Parapet or rail at roof line. 'A parapet'
or rail at least thirty inches in height shall be constructed
at the roof line of every vent shaft in an apartment house or
hotel so that no person may walk or fall into the shaft."
Conduct which is in violation of Section 16827 just read to
you constitutes Nep:ligf'n('" pt'r Re." (lnstru('tion 15.) "If
you find that defendant UJauYIi Peterlion Brickel violated the

)
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statute requiring the parapet around the light well to be
minimum height. her negligence is thereby established.
before plaintiff may recover you must further find that
negligence of sueh defendant was the proximate cause of
tiff's injury and that plaintiff was not guilty of coJltriibutor7i
negligence and that plaintiff was an invitee (or licensee)
to the part of the premises where she was injured."
struction 30.)
For the reasons stated, these instructions should not
been given. [4a] However, Miss Nunneley contends
when a complaint is in two or more counts and the evidence
is sufficient to sustain a judgment upon one of them, error
which affects the other count is immaterial. She relies upon ::
Sh1:el,ds v. ~xnar~ Harbor Dist., ~6 Cal.App.2d 477, 49~ [~18, ',.~~
P.2d 121], lD WhICh the court saId: .. A general verdict UIl·~
ports findings in favor of the prevailing party on all material.,
issues and, if there is substantial evidence to sustain a verdict',
on one count which is unaffected by error. the fact that there"
is not sufficient evidence to sustain the necessary findings of,:;:
fact upon another count to support a verdict. or that there /
haw been errors in connection with such other count, 'Willf~
not justify a reversal of the general verdict."
,.,'
I The instructions make no distinction between the two countl ,
of the complaint. In the first count it was alleged. among),
othrr facts stated as establishing general negligence, thafth~,
Brickels maintained a vent shaft only 27 inches inbeigbt. :
In the second count, Miss Nunneleyass£'rted that, contrary"
to th£' provisions of the Health tlnd Safety Code, thE' parapet;
was less than 30 inches in height. The instruction that
Gladys Peterson Brickel violated the statute". . . her negli.
gence is thereby established . . ." is applicable to the evidenee ".'
presented as tending to prove the cause of action pJeadpd in ,1
either count. For this reason, the Brickels contend that. ,J
although the jury found against both the owner and the 1
manager of the hotel, there is no way of determining whether,
responsibility was laid upon each of them because of general
negligence, or violation of the statute.
However, the instructions relating to the provisionS of the
Hl'aIth and Safety Code referred only to the conduct of Gladys
Peterson Brickel. [5] It must be assumed that the jury
nnderstood the instructions and correctly applied them to the
rvidence. (Henderson v. Lo.' Angeles Traction Co., 150 Cal.
flR9 [89 P. 976] ; Dermer v. Pistoresi, 109 Cal.App. 310 r298
P. 78]; Robinson v. McKnight, 103 Cal.App. 718 [284 P.

ifl'i
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1056].) It follows that the verdict against Charles F. Brickel,
th(' manager of the hotel, was based upon the evidence relating
to general negligence. [4b] There is no contention that the
('vidence in that regard is insufficient to support a verdict
against either of the Brickels. Therefore, the implied finding
of general negligence upon the part of Charles F. Brickel.
b('ing supported by the evidence and unaffected by the in·
structions concerning the requirements of the Health and
Safety Code, fully justifies the verdict and judgment against
him.
The evidence of general negligence is also sufficient to es·
tablish thl' liability of Gladys Peterson Brickel, as the owner
of tht' property. Otherwise stated. the jury could have found
Mrs. Brickel liable for the injuries sustained by Miss Nun·
neley upon the cause of action for general· negligence, the
('vidence as to that charge being applicable to her conduct
all well as to that of ber hnsband. Under these circumstances,
tht' giving of Instructions 15 and 30 did not result in a mis·
carriage of justice. <Cal. Const .. art. VI. § 4%.)
[6] The ground of attack upon the order allowing the
jurors to view thE' place where the accident occurred is that
they might have found the appellants guilty of negligence
bccause barricades and snpporting pipes had~ince.. ~t'en placed
around the top of the ~oof. However. when inspeclingthe--prE'mises the trial judge told the jurors: "This is the roof
that has been referred to, . . . and there are some changes
sin('E' the time of the accident. Those changes arE' to be· en·
tirely disregarded by you. They have nothing whatsoever
to do with the accident." After pointing out the changes
which had been made, be continued, ,. The fact that any
changes have been made does not mean that there is any
intimation upon the part of the defendants or any of them,
that the condition was dangerous at the time of the accident,
nor to be considered by you for any purpose whatsoever. You
are to consider the condition as it existed at the time of the
accident. . . . Is that clear to all of you' The jurors replied
in the affirmative.
The question as to whether the jury should be allowed to
view the premises where an accident occurred is governed
by section 610 of the Code of Civil. Procedure. and is com·
mitted to the sound discretion of the trial ·judge. An appel.
late court will not reverse a judgment bE'causE' of a ruling- in
that regard unless the record clearly shows an abuse of that

/
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discretion. (Brow'll v. Lemon Cove Ditch Co., 36 VG".Q.vv.
[171 P. 705]; see, also, People v. Pompa. 192 Cal. 41
[221 P. 198].) In the present case the order AI1".-;"....
spection of the roof was fully justified and the rights,'
,appellants were carefully protected.
I
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson. C. J., Shenk, J., and Schauer, J., concurred.
Carter, J., concurred in the judgment.
TRAYNOR, J.-I dissent.
I agree that the trial eourt's instructions concerning
gence per Be were erroneous. I 'do not agree, bowever.
the error was not prejudicial.
If there are two independent grounds upon whicb a
may have been based, erroneous instructions as to one
wil1 not justify reversal if it clearly appears that the ---..., ..
w", based upon the other ground.
(Odtinger v. 8f....". :~
Ca1.2d 133, 140 [148 P.2d 19. 156 A..L.R. 1221].) Thiai:'.:
there need be no re"ersal if such other ground is establis~ect ::
asa matter of law (Clement v. State Reclamati01l Boa~d.~~:lr
,Cal.2d 628, 643 (220 P.2d 897]), as, for enmple, by ...1A ".
that are admitted as proved beyond controversy" (O'M~~(~
v. 8.,o"fIg_. 191 Cal. 12.17 (214 P. 975]). If the '~":I
with respect to such other gronnd is substantially hi eOn1tiek~'
however, it is impossible to determine whether the jury basea, ,':'.
its verdict thereon or relied instead upon the ground npoq .~~
which they were erroneously instructed. It is settled thaf~
in su('..h a case the error is prejudicial. ( Young v. 8outher,a
Pacific Co., 182 Cal. 369 [190 P. 36] ; 0 'Meara v. 8wortfigu'r.;~:
191 Cal. 12 [214 P. 975]; Oettinger v. 8tewart, 24 Cal.2d 183 -~
[148 P.2d 19, 156 A..L.R. 1221] ; Huebotter v. Follett, 27 C',.l.'.
2d 765 [167 P.2d 193] ; Edwards v. Freeman, 34 Ca1.2d 589'~
[212 P.2d 883]; Clement v. 8tate Reclamation Board. ,~5";:'
Ca1.2d 628 [220 P.2d 897]; Galloway v. United RailroaiU, 69.,o~
Cal.A.pp. 770 [232 P. 491]; CriBwell v. Pacific Electric BtJil-i
way Co., 48 Oal.App.2d 819 [120 P.2d 670].)
. /'.
In the present case, although the issue of negligence per" ;1
was improperly submitted to the jury, there was evide~ce ~I
of other negligence which, if believed, would support a verdict '1
for the plainti1f. The other alleged acts of negligence were "1:
inadequate lighting, improper placement of the mattress over
the vellt shaft. and absence of warning signs. As to each of
them, however, there was a sharp conflict in the evidence. .
£

.•
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Tbe jury may have rejected these claims of negligence and
relied 80lely upon the court's instructions that the height of
the parapet constituted negligence per lie. Under these circumstances, we should reverse the judgment.
It is contended, however, that the instructions concerning
nt·gligence per
referred only to Mrs. Brickel and that it
necessarily follows from the verdict against Mr. Brickel that
the jury found him guilty of general negligence. It is argued
. further that since he was the manager of the hotel and acting
within the scope of his employment, his negligence is imputed
to his principal, Mrs. Brickel, 80 that she too can be held
liable without reliance on negligence per 8e.
An examination of the erroneous instructions reveals that
they did not refer to Mrs. Brickel exclusively.
Instruction No. IS reads as follows: "HEALTH AND SAFETY
CODE, 16827. Parapet or rail at roof line. 'A parnpt·t or
rail at least thirty inches in height shall be constructl'd at
the roof line of every vent shaft in an apartment hous(' or
hotel 80 that no person may walk or fan into the shaft.'
Conduct which is in violation of Section 16827 just read to
you constitutes negligence per se."
Instruction No. 30 reads as follows: "If you find that dt-fenclant Gladys Peterson Brickel violated the statute requiring
the parapet around the light well to be of minimum height,
her negligence is thereby established. But before plaintiff
may recover you must further find that the negligence of sucll
defendant was the proximate cause of plaintiff's injury and
that plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negligence and
that plaintiff was an invitee as to the part of the premises
where she was injured."
Clearly No. 15 is not limited to Mrs. Brickel, and No. 30,
while referring only to her, does not exclude Mr. Brickel and
may be viewed as illustrative of the way in which No. 15 was
meant to be applied. There is nothing in the pleadings, in
the evidence. or elsewhere in the instructions to the jury to
suggest that plaintiff or the trial court considered Mr. Brickel
to be any less responsible for the violation of the statute
than Mrs. Bri~kel. Neither of the defendants constructed
the building, and therefore the statute could apply only to
the operation of the hotel--eonduct for which Mr. Brickel,
8.<; manager, was as responsible as his wife (Restatement,
Agency, § 355), and the complail1t wal'; so framed.
If the trial court had charged that "residing in Santa
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AlI8 is negligence per lie," the error would have affected
defendants. This error would not be corrected as to
Brickel by a later instruction that "if you find that uelleDQ8.I
. U1adys Peterson Brickel resides in Santa Ana, her
i~ tht>reby established" - such an instruction would
rath<'1' to illustrate the general rule already given. The
stJ'(wtions in the present case are analogous, and it must
l~()ncluded that both defendants were prejudicially
by them.

j
)

Spence. J" concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied Jan11&17
15, 1951. 'l'raynor, J., and Spence, J., voted for a rehearina.
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